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THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT AND THE
CORPUS OF ANTI-
DISCRIMINATION LAW:
A FORCE FOR CHANGE IN THE
FUTURE OF PUBLIC HEALTH
REGULATION
Lawrence 0. Gostint
LEGAL CONTROLS over the unfettered exercise of public
health powers have long been regarded as ineffective and idiosyn-
cratic.1 Public health statutes (many written before the sciences of
virology, bacteriology and epidemiology had fully come of age)
delegate wide ranging powers to officials.' The major check on the
exercise of these powers has been constitutional review by the judi-
ciary. The courts, however, are reluctant to interfere in public
health decision making, and have not yet developed a cogent set of
criteria for establishing effective boundaries around the proper exer-
cise of public health authority.
This paper argues that constitutional review-long the standard
bearer for judicial activity in the public health realm-is quietly,
but effectively, being replaced with a more cogent statutory review.
That review is provided by disability law. The advent of disability
t Lawrence 0. Gostin is a Visiting Professor at Georgetown University Law Center
and the Johns Hopkins School of Hygiene and Public Health. This work is an expansion of
ideas previously explored in Lawrence 0. Gostin, The Americans with Disabilities Act and the
U.S. Health Care System, 11 HEALTH AFF. 248 (1992) and Lawrence 0. Gostin, Public
Health Powers: the Imminence of Radical Change, 69 MILBANK Q. 268 (1991).
1. See Scott Burris, Rationality Review and the Politics of Public Health, 34 VILL. L.
REv. 933, 933-82 (1989). Scott Burris, Fear Itsel." AIDS, Herpes, and Public Health Deci-
sions, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 479 (1985); Deborah Jones Merritt, Communicable Disease
and Constitutional Law: Controlling AIDS, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 739 (1986); Wendy Parmet,
AIDS and Quarantine: The Revival of an Archaic Doctrine, 14 HoiSTRA L. REv. 53 (1985);
Wendy Parmet, Health Care and the Constitution: Public Health and the Role of the State in
the Framing Era, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q., Spring 1993 (forthcoming).
2. Lawrence Gostin, The Future of Public Health Law, 12 AM. J. L. & MED. 461
(1986).
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law is remarkably recent. The first comprehensive federal disability
statute was not enacted until the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The
Rehabilitation Act was followed by perfecting amendments (e.g.,
the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1988) and new statutes (e.g., the
Fair Housing Amendments of 1988), culminating in the landmark
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA).
The ADA and the corpus of disability law are regarded as
highly effective mechanisms to redress discrimination and remove
physical barriers for people with disabilities. Remarkably, the legis-
lative history of the Rehabilitation Act shows that Congress gave
only the scantiest attention to the possibility that the law might ap-
ply to communicable disease. Indeed, the definitive affirmation of
the role of disability law to protect persons with infectious condi-
tions did not occur until the Supreme Court's Arline decision in
1987. 3
Even in the Congressional deliberations on the ADA, confusion
reigned as to whether and how the ADA might control the exercise
of public health powers, and whether the ADA should preempt
state communicable disease laws. The Congress viewed this ques-
tion in a most narrow and uninstructive way during the debates on
the distracting question of food handlers.
The judicial and congressional inattention to the broader public
health impact of the ADA is ill-conceived. I will argue that this
landmark legislation will unleash a powerful review mechanism that
will set effective boundaries on the historic exercise of public health
powers. This statutory review will, moreover, gradually supplant
much, but not all, of the constitutional analyses in the public health
sphere. Ultimately, the ADA will provide a much needed impetus
for states to reform fundamentally outdated statutes relevant to
communicable and sexually transmitted disease. This reformation
will bring state statutes into conformity with the letter and spirit of
the ADA.4
First, this paper will review the constitutional history of the
courts' attempts to check the powers of the public health depart-
ment. Such a review will demonstrate how ineffective and inconsis-
tent constitutional review has been, and suggest that adequate
review criteria have not emerged. This section will show that,
whether the courts are applying First, Fourth, or Fourteenth
3. School Bd. of Nassaw County, Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
4. The Milbank Memorial Fund and the U.S. Centers for Disease Control have spon-
sored a project on the future of communicable disease law chaired by the author.
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Amendment standards, ultimately they are highly deferential to
public health officials. Second, this paper will carefully examine the
key concepts in the ADA as they apply to communicable disease.
This section will reveal Congress' clear intention to include commu-
nicable disease, even asymptomatic infection, as a disability. It will
also define and analyze the new "direct threat" standard in the
ADA, particularly its application to exercise of public health pow-
ers under Title II (public services) of the Act. Finally, the paper
will propose a standard of review under the ADA for the future
regulation of public health powers.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL PARAMETERS OF PUBLIC
HEALTH POWERS: A DECIDEDLY
DEFERENTIAL APPROACH
Constitutional review of the exercise of public health powers is
plagued by a continuing sense of doctrinal uncertainty. The early
courts were highly deferential to state public health regulation
under the police powers. To some courts, the Constitution had "no
application to this class of case."5 "Where the police power is set in
motion in its proper sphere, the courts have no jurisdiction to stay
the arm of the legislative branch."6 One court went so far as to
declare the universality of the judicial rule that "constitutional
guaranties must yield... to promote the public health."7 Even as
late as 1966, a court held that "drastic measures for the elimination
of disease are not affected by constitutional provisions, either of the
state or national government."8
Most courts have not totally abdicated their responsibility to set
limits on the authority of public health departments. Certainly a set
of minimalist principles can be ascertained. In the seminal case of
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, the Supreme Court held that a vaccina-
tion requirement must have a "real or substantial relation" to pub-
lic health objectives and could not be a "plain, palpable invasion of
rights." The state "must refrain from acting in an arbitrary, unrea-
sonable manner," or "going so far beyond what [is] reasonably re-
5. In re Caselli, 204 P. 364, 364 (1922).
6. Arizona ex reL Conway v. Southern Pacific Co., 145 P.2d 530, 532 (1943) (quoting
State ex reL McBride v. Superior Court, 174 P. 973, 976 (1918)).
7. People ex rel. Baker v. Strauz, 54 N.E.2d 441, 444 (Ill. 1944).
8. In re Halko, 246 Cal. App. 2d 553, 566, 54 Cal. Rptr. 661, 663 (1966) citing Larsen
v. Board of Supervisors, 214 N.W. 682, 684 (Iowa 1927), in Deborah June Merritt, Commu-
nicable Disease and Constitutional Law: Controlling AIDS, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 739 (1986).
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quired for the safety of the public.' 9
The "arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable" standard is highly
deferential. States need only show a good faith intention to pro-
mote the public health, as well as some medical evidence that the
restriction of individual rights may be beneficial to the health of the
community. Since Jacobson, no uniform and coherent set of criteria
have emerged from the courts in reviewing public health powers."0
We like to believe that modem constitutional doctrine goes
much further in setting rational boundaries around the exercise of
public health powers. However, modem constitutional review is re-
markably similar in approach to Jacobson. Although courts have
occasionally engaged in more focused scrutiny, modem constitu-
tional law in the public health sphere is drawn to be highly mechan-
istic. It places overly burdensome restrictions on some public
health measures while placing virtually no restriction on others. It
is difficult to predict the outcome of cases and so provides little gui-
dance to legislators and public health officials. The courts have
failed to establish clear criteria on the critical balance between re-
strictions on individual rights, level of risk to the public, and effi-
cacy of the control measure. Courts have based their review of
public health powers on either the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Fourth Amendment, or the First Amendment, but a deferential bal-
ancing test, reminiscent of Jacobson, is evident irrespective of the
constitutional vehicle.
A. Substantive Due Process and Equal Protection Under the
Fourteenth Amendment
Constitutional theorists point to a highly mechanistic two-
tiered11 approach to judicial decision making which emerged during
the last several decades.12 The lowest level of scrutiny (the "ra-
9. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 28-31 (1905).
10. At various times, however, courts have required three conditions for upholding pub-
lic health regulation. See City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432
(1985) (requiring the true purpose of the power must be for the preservation of health and not
some ulterior motive); In re Martin, 83 Cal. App. 2d 164, 188 P.2d 287, 291 (1948) (requir-
ing that the subject of compulsory power actually be infectious before the control measure
could be imposed); ex parte Shepard, 51 Cal. App. 49, 195 P. 1077 (1921) (requiring more
than mere suspicion before invoking health regulation). See also Jew Ho v. Williamson, 103
F. 10, 22 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1900) (great discretion is given to a state to decide which measures
are necessary to protect the public health but the measure in itself should not pose a health
risk to the subject).
11. A third tier, intermediate scrutiny, most often applied in instances of gender dis-
crimination, is inapplicable in this analysis. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
12. LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 16 (2d. ed. 1988).
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tional basis" test) validates state conduct which does not impinge
upon a fundamental right or suspect class so long as it is reasonably
related to a valid government purpose.1 3 Since public health repre-
sents a highly beneficial purpose, courts afford the state "maximum
deference" 14 under this standard of review. Courts often uphold
the public health decisions of the state without a careful examina-
tion of benefits and risks in contexts ranging from classifying and
reporting infectious disease,1" to the control of sexually transmitted
and needle-borne infections in bathhouses, 16 theaters, 17 book-
stores,18 and prisons.19 In all of these cases the courts readily yield
to the discretion of state officials. Issues critical to public health
analysis barely surface under the lowest level of judicial review:
whether the action is overly burdensome of individual rights,
whether it comports with the clear weight of scientific opinion, and
whether there are less restrictive ways of accomplishing the public
health objective.
The highest level of judicial scrutiny occurs when states impinge
on "fundamental" rights such as travel,20 marriage, 21 and certain
privacy interests associated with reproduction. 22 Strict scrutiny is
also triggered if the state burdens certain "suspect" classes such as
race?' or national alienage.24 Such measures must be narrowly tai-
lored to serve a compelling objective, and must be the least restric-
tive alternative for achieving that objective.25
These two traditional tiers of constitutional review are outcome
13. See, eg., Kardmas v. Dickinson Public Schools, 108 S.Ct. 2481, 2489-90 (1988).
14. James A. Kushnar, Substantive Equal Protection: The Rehnquist Court and the
Fourth Tier of Judicial Review. 53 Mo. L. REv. 423, 449-50 (1988).
15. See New York State Society of Surgeons v. Axelrod, 157 A.D.2d 54 (N.Y. App. Div.
1990) (holding that nothing positive would be gained by designation of HIV infection as a
communicable or sexually transmissible disease).
16. City of N.Y. v. New St. Mark's Baths, 130 Misc. 2d 911 (N.Y. Sup. 1986), aff'd, 122
A.D. 2d 747 (1986); People v. 3Mc S, AIDS LIT. RrR., Sept. 9, 1988; Los Angeles v. Ben-
son, AIDS LIT. Rrm., May 13, 1988.
17. Public Health: Theatre Closure, AIDS LIT. RpTR., Oct. 28, 1988, at 1640.
18. Eg., Movie & Video World, Inc. v. Board. of Comm'rs of Palm Beach, 723 F. Supp.
695 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
19. Eg., Muhammad v. Carlson, 845 F.2d 175 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, Muhammad
v. Quinlan, 489 U.S. 1068 (1989); see also, Doe v. Coughlin, 518 N.E. 2d 536, 523 N.Y.S.2d
782 (1987), cert denied, 488 U.S. 879 (1988).
20. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-31 (1969).
21. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1966); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383-84
(1978).
22. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
23. See, eg., Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
24. See, eg., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
25. Eg., Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969); Cf., Adding-
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determinative. Once the standard of review is decided upon, it is
highly predictive of the decision of the court. Thus, public health
measures which burden personal freedom (e.g., isolation or quaran-
tine), marriage (e.g., a ban on marriage of persons with sexually
transmitted infections), or define a class based upon race (e.g., strict
limitations on sickle cell disease) theoretically ought to be subject to
intensive review.26 The public health justification would have to
overwhelm the human rights concerns. If, however, the public
health measure did not directly burden these almost arbitrary
touchstones of constitutional jurisprudence, they might receive a
perfunctory examination, where the courts almost obsequiously
yield to public health judgements. In either case, there is little room
for clear and cogent review criteria which carefully measure risk,
efficacy, alternatives, and human rights burdens.
While the Supreme Court is slowly moving from this rigid tiered
approach to constitutional review, the Court's new decision-making
process is still largely uninstructive and unpredictable. The
Cleburne 7 doctrine, often referred to as a third tier of constitu-
tional review, does not take the inquiry much further than the post-
Jacobson "true purpose" test.28 The Cleburne court invalidated a
zoning ordinance excluding group homes for mentally handicapped
people. The Court did not raise its standard of review, but never-
theless searched into the record to conclude that no rational basis
existed to warrant a legislative finding that mentally handicapped
people posed a threat. What the legislature may not do is base its
decision on "vague, undifferentiated fears" or "irrational
prejudice."2 9
Recently, the court has refrained from finding new "fundamen-
ton v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 427 (1979) (state must justify confinement by proof more substan-
tial than a mere preponderance of the evidence).
26. As late as the 1960's, however, courts were treating public health decisions offering
liberty as if they did not require serious scrutiny at all. See In re Halko, 246 Cal. App. 2d
553, 54 Cal. Rptr. 661 (2d Dist. 1966) (upholding isolation of persons with pulmonary tuber-
culosis without any inquiry as to whether it was essential to the public health; only question
asked by the court was whether the health officer had probable cause to believe the person
had an infectious disease). "The Legislature is vested with broad discretion in determining
what are contagious and infectious diseases and in adopting means for preventing the spread
thereof." 246 Cal. App. 2d at 557; See also, Moore v. Armstrong, 149 So. 2d 36 (S.Ct. Fla.
1963) (upholding detention of person in a tuberculosis hospital).
27. City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
28. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1,12 (1966); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383-
84 (1978).
29. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 449,450. See also, Brennan v. Stewart, 834 F.2d 1248,
1258 (5th Cir. 1988) (decisions based on physical and mental disabilities should be reviewed
"somewhat closer than usual").
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tal" rights, particularly in medically related fields. Rather, courts
have referred to a series of "liberty interests" to refuse psychotropic
medication,30 avoid admission to mental hospitals, 31 or to withdraw
life sustaining treatment.32 The right to be left alone by public
health officials or doctors, is, however, only one interest to be bal-
anced against a series of competing state interests. Notably, in each
of these cases, the state interests prevailed over the liberty interest
of the individual. In essence, the Court's notion of a "liberty inter-
est" is so weak that it begins to resemble a rational basis test-the
medical activity is upheld so long as the state can point to some
legitimate justification. The Court certainly has not yet enunciated
how collective and personal interests will be balanced or reconciled
in particular cases.
B. Search and Seizure: Blood and Urine Tests, Screening,
and the Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches
and seizures has long been construed to apply to blood and urine
tests. Under the Warren Court's Schmerber doctrine, probable
cause, or at least individual suspicion, must exist before testing
without consent: "warrants are ordinarily required for searches of
dwellings and absent an emergency, no less could be required where
intrusions into the human body are concerned. ' 33 The courts rec-
ognize that "the integrity of an individual's person is a cherished
value . . .which is protected from unreasonable searches and
seizures."
34
The Schmerber doctrine ought not to be susceptible to the same
vacuous balancing test that occurs under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, but that is exactly where it is leading.
The Supreme Court assigns a privacy value to be free from
forced medical testing. But it balances that privacy value against
the intrusiveness of the bodily search and the public interest it is
designed to effectuate. The Court has recognized state interests
such as "national security"35 and "public safety"3 6 in drug testing
30. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221 (1990).
31. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
32. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Heath, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
33. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966).
34. People v. Bracamonte, 540 P.2d 624, 632 (S.Ct. Cal. 1975) quoting Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757, 772 (1966).
35. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 674 (1989).
36. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 615 (1989) ("permissibil-
19931
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without any careful examination of whether testing will achieve the
stated objective.
The Court is quietly abandoning each of the key principles of
the Schmerber doctrine including the requirement of a warrant, in-
dividualized suspicion or probable cause, and a clear nexus to
achievable public health goals. For example, courts have used the
"special needs" doctrine to justify nonconsensual testing of sexual
offenders conducted without the procedural safeguards of a warrant
or individualized suspicion.37 Courts have also declared that the
judiciary may use equitable authority to compel testing in the ab-
sence of statutory authority.3" The result of this disintegration of
the Schmerber doctrine is a pure balancing test where little gui-
dance is provided on which interests weigh more heavily, and where
public health discretion is generally upheld.
Courts have been highly deferential in reviewing federal and
state screening programs. Federal courts have upheld HIV screen-
ing in the Departments of State39 and Defense,' and cases are
pending challenging screening of Job Corps applicants41 as well as
immigrants and temporary visitors to the United States.42 Since
HIV is not transmitted casually, and there is little risk of transmis-
sion by any known modality in these settings, it is difficult to con-
ceive how large scale indiscriminate screening achieves rigorous
public health objectives.43
ity of a particular practice is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth
Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests").
37. In the Matter of Juveniles A, B, C, D, and E, 847 P.2d 455 (Wash. 1993) (holding
that a statute requiring mandatory HIV testing of convicted sex offenders applied to juveniles
under the "special needs" doctrine where the state's interest in testing high risk groups and
protecting society from the spread of HIV outweighed the privacy interests of the offenders,
the statute was narrowly-tailored to the purpose, and the testing was not conducted for law
enforcement purposes).
38. Syring v. Tucker, 498 N.W.2d 370 (Wis. 1993) (holding that the circuit court, de-
spite the absence of statutory authority, had authority in equity to compel HIV testing of a
woman who bit a social worker).
39. Local 1812, Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. U.S. Dept. of State, 662 F. Supp. 50
(D.D.C. 1987).
40. Batten v. Lehman, U.S.D.C. Cal., No.85-4108, Jan. 18, 1986.
41. Dorsey v. U.S. Dept. of Labor, U.S.D.C. No. 88-1898.
42. See Larry Gostin et al., Screening Immigrants and International Travelers for the
Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 322 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1743, 1743-46 (1990). With re-
gard to recent HIV testing of Haitian immigrants seeking refuge in the United States, the
United States District Court found that subjecting HIV positive detainees to a second screen-
ing, conducted without an attorney present, violated the Refugee Act and the Due Process
rights of the detainees. Haitian Centers Council, Inc. v. Sale, 823 F.Supp. 1028 (E.D.N.Y.
1993).
43. See Gostin, supra note 42, at 1743-46; see also, Larry Gostin et al., The Case Against
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In Leckelt 4 the court rejected a Fourth Amendment claim by a
nurse who was required to be tested for HIV against his will. The
hospital argued that the test was necessary to protect the health of
patients, even though there was not a single case of health care pro-
fessional-to-patient transmission of HIV at the time.45 Kevin Leek-
elt's medical condition (infection with the Hepatitis B Virus),
apparent homosexuality, and long term relationship with a partner
with AIDS meant that the hospital had individualized suspicion.
The court, without any finding that Leckelt posed a significant risk
to patients or staff, upheld the testing because of the generalized
need to protect the health of employees and prevent the spread of
infectious disease.
Curiously, another federal Court of Appeals found that indis-
criminate HIV screening of all hospital staff violated the Fourth
Amendment because the "risk was low, approaching zero."' Cer-
tainly, these cases can be distinguished because one involved indi-
vidualized suspicion and the other a broader screening program.
Still, the public health justifications were similar, and no data could
be offered showing even an elevated risk to patients.
C. Freedoms of Expression and Religion: Does the First
Amendment Effectively Impede Public Health Officials
in the Exercise of their Authority?
At the heart of the conflict between public health and individual
Compulsory Casefinding in Controlling AIDS: Testing, Screening, and Reporting, 12 AM. J.L.
& MED. 7, 19-20 (1986).
44. Leckelt v. Board of Comm'rs of Hosp. Dist. No. 1, 909 F.2d 820, 832-33 (5th Cir.
1990).
45. There is one instance of believed transmission of HIV infection from a health care
professional to patients, that of the dentist, Dr. David Acer, in Florida. Dr. Acer may have
transmitted the virus to as many as five patients, including Kimberly Bergalis, who later
testified before Congress regarding health care professional-to-patient transmission. The
Centers for Disease Control has promulgated guidelines to prevent this type of transmission,
calling for the use of universal precautions in the care of all patients, especially in procedures
involving blood and other bodily fluids such as semen, vaginal secretions and amniotic fluid.
Some specifications of universal precautions include 1) use of barrier protection such as
gloves and goggles, 2) immediate washing of hands after performing procedures, 3) careful
use of sharp instruments to prevent injury, and 4) prohibition of health care professionals
with exudative lesions or weeping dermatitis from direct patient care. Centers for Disease
Control, Update: Universal Precautions for Prevention of Transmission of the Human Immu-
nodeficiency Virus Hepatitis B Virus and Other Bloodborn Pathogens in Health-Care Settings,
37 MORBIDrTY & MoRTALrrY WEEKLY REP. 277 (1988); see also Larry Gostin, Hospitals,
Health Core Professionals, and AIDS: The "Right to Know" the Health Status of Professionals
and Patients, 48 Md. L.Rev. 12, 24 (1989).
46. Glover v. Eastern Neb. Community Office of Retardation, 867 F.2d 461, 463 (8th
Cir. 1989), cert denied, 493 U.S. 932 (1989).
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rights is the claim by citizens that they possess fundamental free-
doms which public health officials cannot diminish. Many public
health cases have been adjudicated under the First Amendment be-
cause the subjects of regulation claim that it interferes with their
freedom of expression, association, or religion. Two paradigmatic
cases emerge: first, the right of persons to refuse compulsory vacci-
nation47 or treatment48 because it is contrary to their religious be-
liefs49 and, second, the rights of persons to frequent bathhouses,
video stores, theaters, and other public places in the exercise of their
freedoms of expression and association. Despite the absolutist lan-
guage of the First Amendment (Congress shall pass "no law"
abridging these freedoms), the courts have resorted to a familiar
balancing test where state interests are afforded great weight and
deference.
1. Compulsory vaccination cases
A great majority of states have enacted compulsory or local op-
tion vaccination statutes. These statutes were the subject of fre-
quent constitutional attack and were almost universally upheld. 0
While freedom of religion was not a central concern in all cases,"1
many courts upheld compulsory vaccination in the face of First
Amendment claims.52 Freedom of religion does "not import an ab-
47. Se4 eg., Brown v. Stone, 378 So. 2d 218 (Miss. 1979) (holding that interests of
school children prevail over parents' religious beliefs) cert denied, 449 U.S. 887 (1980).
48. State ex rel. Holcomb v. Armstrong, 239 P.2d 545 (Wash. 1952) (upholding chest x-
ray requirement as condition for university registration against religious challenge).
49. Maricopa County Health Dept. v. Hammon, 750 P.2d 1364 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987)
(holding that policy of the state is "to balance the individuals' rights to education against the
states" need to protect against the spread of infectious and contagious disease).
50. Itz v. Penick, 493 S.W.2d 506 (Tex. 1973) (holding that except in certain religious
and medical exemptions, mandatory immunization before admission into school does not
interfere with parents' rights, equal protection, due process, delegation of power, or access to
education). But see, Davis v. Maryland, 451 A.2d 107 (Md. 1982) (holding that the legisla-
ture's religious exemption from compulsory immunization must not violate the Establish-
ment clause).
51. Several courts have upheld the statute on grounds other than the First Amendment.
See, eg., Heard v. Payne, 665 S.W.2d 865, 867 (Ark. 1984) (holding that a chiropractor who
believes children are allergic to vaccine is not permitted to exempt them from immunization)
reh'g denied (1984); State ex reL Mack v. Board of Educ., 204 N.E.2d 86, 89 (Ohio Ct. App.
1963) (holding that child does not have absolute right to enter school without immunization
solely based on parent's objection) reh'g denied (1963); Pierce v. Board of Educ. of Fulton,
219 N.Y.S.2d 519, 520 (N.Y. 1961) (upholding statute despite parents' belief that vaccination
would be detrimental to their children); Stull v. Reber, 64 A. 419, 419 (Pa. 1906) (holding
that lack of consent to vaccination is not trespass on individual's rights).
52. Many courts have used the rationale that public health takes precedence over reli-
gious freedom. See, e.g., Brown v. Stone, 378 So.2d 218, 220 (Miss. 1979) reh'g denied
(1980), and cert denied, 449 U.S. 887 (1980); Wright v. DeWitt Sch. Dist., 385 S.W.2d 644,
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solute right in each person to be, at all times and in all circum-
stances, wholly freed from restraint. There are manifold restraints
to which every person is necessarily subject for the common
good." 3 Indeed, compulsory vaccination need not even be trig-
gered by the existence of an epidemic 4; nor must a grave or imme-
diate health risk exist to outweigh religious liberty." However, one
court has refused to intervene when the urgency previously created
by an epidemic has passed. 6
Courts, however, do not allow public health officials completely
free reign to immunize the community from preventable disease.
While the state may vest broad discretion in its officials,57 they must
regulate fairly." Public health officials have broad discretion under
many state statutes to provide a religious exemption to vaccination,
but they cannot exercise this discretion arbitrarily.5 9
646 (Ark. 1965); Cudev. State, 377 S.W.2d 816, 819 (Ark. 1964) reh'g denied (1964); Sadlock
v. Board of Educ. of Carlstadt, 58 A.2d 218, 220 (N.J. 1948). Moreover, the Supreme Court
has made plain its view that public health imperatives in vaccination programs overrides
religious freedoms and that a state need not provide a religious exemption for its immuniza-
tion program in dictum. See, Prince v. Mass., 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944), cert. denied, 321
U.S. 804. A New York court has required a demonstration that opposition to inoculation
stem from sincerely held religious convictions and not merely be framed in terms of religious
belief in order to gain the exemption required. In the Matter of Christine M., 595 N.Y.S.2d
606 (1992).
53. Syska v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 415 A.2d 301, 304 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1980) citing Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26 (1905) (holding that compulsory
rubella immunization for school admission did not violate mother's constitutional right).
54. See In re Elwell, 284 N.Y.S.2d 924, 930 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1967) (holding that compul-
sory vaccination for school admission is valid exercise of the state police power to prevent
against disease). See also, Board of Educ. v. Maas, 152 A.2d 394 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1959) cert. denied, 363 U.S. 843 (1960) (holding that vaccinations are an effective health
measure and are within the power of the legislature).
55. Wright v. DeWitt Sch. Dist., 385 S.W.2d 644 (Ark. 1965) (holding that mandatory
vaccination outweighs religious liberty even when there is no grave or immediate health risk).
56. In the Matter of Christine M, 595 N.Y.S.2d 606 (1992).
57. See Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174 (1922) (holding that it is constitutional for public
officials to be vested with the authority to enforce compulsory school vaccinations for the
protection of public health).
58. Raper v. Lucey, 488 F.2d 748, 753 (1st Cir. 1973). See Avard v. Dupuis, 376 F.
Supp. 479, 482 (D.N.H. 1974) (holding the religious exemption standardless and
unconstitutional).
59. Brown v. Stone, 378 So.2d 218 (Miss. 1979) (holding that provisions of a compul-
sory vaccination statute providing religious exceptions violated the Equal Protection Clause);
Kolbeck v. Rutgers, the State Univ., 202 A.2d 889, 893 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1964)
(holding that the state cannot show a preference for one religion over another when creating
exemptions for mandatory vaccinations); Davis v. Maryland, 451 A.2d 107, 113 (Md. 1982)
(holding that a student vaccine exemption which recognizes that parents are members of a
recognized church or religious denomination violates the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment).
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2. The bathhouses and adult video shop cases
Government action to impede the spread of sexually transmitted
infection has often focused on the closure or regulation of public
places such as bathhouses, adult video shops, theaters, and book-
stores." Regulation of public places, particularly where literature,
films, or live theater is presented, implicates the First Amendment
freedoms of expression, press, and association. Theoretically, these
freedoms cannot be abridged absent a "substantial governmental in-
terest."'" Nonetheless, courts have shown little hesitation in up-
holding regulation, even closure, of such establishments in the name
of public health.62 To these courts, the preservation of public
health is an overriding state purpose.63 Because of the presence of a
compelling public health objective, courts have not always required
that the state prove the restriction on First Amendment rights is
strictly necessary. Governments have broad latitude in experi-
menting with possible solutions to public health problems." Thus,
courts faced with free expression or association claims require only
some reasonable scientific evidence of a public health necessity, even
if there is an equally respected scientific view that the restriction is
not essential to the public health.65
The bathhouse cases emerge as powerful examples of scientific
60. Eg., City of New York v. New Saint Mark's Bath, 497 N.Y.S. 2d 979, 983 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1986) (holding that closure of bathhouse would not violate First Amendment
rights of association and privacy); Mitchell & Bob's Discount Adult Bookstore, Inc. v. Com-
missioner of the Comm'n on Adult Entertainment Establishments of the State of Delaware,
802 F.Supp. 112 (D.Del. 1992) (holding that ordinance amendments regulating hours of
adult book stores and prohibiting closed booths are Constitutional as means to further state
interest of curbing the spread of AIDS).
61. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (laying down a four part test:
1) the regulation must be within the constitutional power of the government; 2) it must
further an important or substantial government interest; 3) the government interest must be
unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and 4) the incidental restriction on First
Amendment freedoms must be no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest).
62. See generally, Stephen L. Collier, Comment, Preventing the Spread of AIDS by Re-
stricting Sexual Conduct in Gay Bathhouses A Constitutional Analysis, 15 GOLDEN GATE
U.L. REV. 301 (1985); Note, The Constitutional Rights of AIDS Carriers, 99 HARV. L. REv.
1274 (1986).
63. Eg., State v. Mountain Timber Co., 135 P. 645, 647 (Wash. 1913), aff'd, 243 U.S.
219 (1916) (holding that the police power of the state permits interference with individual
liberty whenever public interest demands it).
64. Eg., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (holding that state legislation which affects
individual liberty or privacy may not be held unconstitutional simply because the court found
it unnecessary); See also, Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 499 (1973) (holding that
the state can regulate obscene material although there is a lack of definite proof of a nexus
between anti-social behavior and obscene material).
65. See generally, Burris, Rationality Review and the Politics of Public Health, 34 VILL.
L. REv. 933, 969 (1989).
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uncertainty about the best public health approach. 6 To some, the
health risk represented by sexual activity with anonymous partners
in bathhouses is unmistakable. To others, however, closure only
means that sexual activity will move to another venue, and an op-
portunity for targeted health promotion would be lost. In uphold-
ing the closure of bathhouses,67 courts reasoned that they need not
choose among reasonable scientific alternatives: "The judicial func-
tion is exhausted with the discovery that the relation between means
and end is not wholly vain and fanciful, and illusory pretense., 68
Even when operating under the First Amendment, therefore, the
courts will not gage the scientific merits of decisions to close public
places.69
Still less clear is the impact of adult video stores, theaters, or
bookstores in contributing to the spread of sexually transmitted in-
fections. Federal7° and state71 courts have almost universally up-
66. See generally, RONALD BAYER, PRIVATE AcTS, SocIAL CONSEQUENCES: AIDs
AND THE POLrICS OF PUBLIC HEALTH (1989).
67. California v. Three 3MCS, Inc. No. C685816 slip op (Cal. Sup. Ct. Aug. 30, 1988);
Los Angeles v. Benson, Super. CL LA City, Cal. AIDS Lit. Rptr.; May 13, 1988. See also,
City of New York v. Big Apple Spa, 130 Misc. 2d 920, 497 N.Y.S.2d 988 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1986) (court used same rationale with regard to heterosexual conduct).
68. City of New York v. New Saint Mark's Bath, 497 N.Y.S.2d 979, 983 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1986) (holding that closure of bathhouse would not violate First Amendment rights of
association and privacy).
69. California v. Three 3MCS, Inc., No. C685816, slip op at 8-9 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Aug. 30,
1988) ("it is not the function of the courts to determine which scientific view is correct"). One
notable exception occurred in San Francisco where a less restrictive alternative was required
so that bathhouses could remain open subject to strict regulation designed to decrease unpro-
tected sexual activities. California ex rel. Agnost v. Owen, No. 830 321 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov.
30, 1984).
70. Eg., Mitchell & Bob's Discount Adult Bookstore, Inc. v. Commissioner of the
Comm'n on Adult Entertainment Establishments of the State of Delaware, 802 F.Supp. 112
(D.Del. 1992) (holding that ordinance amendments regulating hours of adult book stores and
prohibiting closed booths are Constitutional as means to further state interest of curbing the
spread of AIDS); Bamon Corp. v. City of Dayton, 923 F.2d 470 (6th Cir. 1991) (affirming
summary judgment in favor of city ordinance regulating open doors in adult book stores);
Postscript Enterprises v. City of Bridgeton, 905 F.2d 223 (8th Cir. 1990) (affirming summary
judgment in favor of ordinance requiring open doors for viewing areas in adult book store);
Wall Distrib., Inc. v. City of Newport News, 782 F.2d 1165, 1168 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding
that ordinances making it a criminal offense to exhibit films in enclosed booths was valid
restriction on manner of speech); See also, Ellwest Stereo Theaters, Inc. v. Wenner, 681 F.2d
1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that city ordinance requiring that viewing areas of booth
in which coin-operated viewing devices are located be visible from main aisle is reasonable
regulation of manner in which films may be viewed); Movie & Video World v. Board of
County Comm'rs, 723 F. Supp. 695,701 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (upholding regulation that all doors
be removed from booths showing sexually explicit films); Doe v. City of Minneapolis, 898
F.2d 612 (8th Cir. 1990) (upholding constitutionality of ordinance requiring removal of doors
to booths in adult book stores); Suburban Video v. City of Delafield, 694 F. Supp. 585, 587
(E.D. Wis. 1988) (holding that open door requirement of booths did not violate 1st Amend-
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held the constitutionality of local ordinances that require viewing
booths to be open and viable to the public. Courts have validated
the delegation of authority to local governing bodies such as county
health departments and Boards of Supervisors, declaring such ordi-
nances akin to those passed by the legislature itself.72 Again, courts
do not require the risk to public health to be proven.73 The govern-
ment is entitled to "infer" a health threat from evidence that more
than one person sometimes occupies a booth at the same time.74
Equal protection and undue burden arguments regarding open
viewing booths have also been rejected by the courts. 5
The goal of regulation is to prevent sexual activity, including
masturbation, "and its related unsanitary conditions and other ac-
tivities offensive to decency that demonstrably accompany furtive
ment rights); Berg v. Health & Hosp. Corp., 667 F. Supp. 639, 641 (S.D. Ind. 1987) (uphold-
ing constitutionality of open door requirement), aff'd, 865 F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1989);
Broadway Books v. Roberts, 642 F. Supp. 486, 492 (E.D. Tenn. 1986) (upholding validity of
open booth requirement).
71. City News & Novelty, Inc. v. City of Waukesha, 487 N.W.2d 316 (Wis.Ct.App.
1992) (affirming summary judgment for city ordinance requiring viewing booths to be view-
able from public points in adult oriented establishments as a means to control the spread of
communicable diseases like AIDS); City of Lincoln, Neb. v. ABC Books, Inc., 470 N.W.2d
760 (Neb. 1991) (denying injunctive relief from ordinance that required visibility of booths in
an adult book store); Centaur, Inc. v. Richland County, S.C., 392 S.E.2d 165 (S.C. 1990)
(upholding constitutionality of ordinance requiring unobstructed view of every area in inte-
rior of sexually oriented businesses); Adult Entertainment Ctr., Inc. v. Pierce County, 788
P.2d 1102, 1106 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that open booth requirement of ordinance
providing for licensing of businesses providing booths for their customers to view sexually
explicit material was reasonable time, place, and manner restriction); See also, Rahmani v.
State, 748 S.W.2d 618, 621 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that permit requirements did not
constitute impermissible prior restraint on free speech), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1081 (1989);
Lopex v. State, 756 S.W.2d 49, 51 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (upholding validity of local ordinance
requiring a permit as proof of interior design compliance to discourage the use of an adult
arcade as a place for sexual encounters); EWAP Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 97 Cal. App. 3d
179, 182 (1979) (upholding ordinance denying permits for the operation of picture shows if
any person involved knowingly allowed any sexual acts or solicitations for such acts in the
picture arcade).
72. Marsoner v. Pima County, 803 P.2d 897 (Ariz. 199 1)(reversing appellate court deci-
sion that Board of Supervisors lacked authority to enact ordinance requiring licensing of
adult amusement establishments).
73. Adult Entertainment Ctr. v. Pierce County, 788 P.2d at 1105 (when holding the
open booth requirement as constitutional, the court noted that the necessity for the legislation
need not be proven absolutely).
74. Id. at 1105-06 (requiring the testimony of only one person in boot as sufficient to
claim health risk).
75. Doe v. City of Minneapolis, 898 F.2d at 620-22 (holding that ordinance requiring
removal of doors to booths in adult book stores treated similarly situated commercial estab-
lishments the same; economic effect on book stores not controlling in First Amendment
analysis).
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viewings of sexually explicit materials."7 6 Courts have viewed regu-
lation of book stores and video shops for public health purposes as
"time, place, and manner" restrictions." Regulation of these shops
were upheld because they were content-neutral and narrowly tai-
lored to serve a public health purpose, and left ample alternative
channels of communication.7" Local officials, however, may not im-
pose onerous licensing requirements such as demanding a high
moral character from the proprietor or an inordinately expensive
license fee.7 9
The lack of clear standards of constitutional review results in
inconsistent and unpredictable decision making, and gives little gui-
dance as to the lawfulness of an array of public health powers. The
Americans with Disabilities Act and the corpus of anti-discrimina-
tion law should close that doctrinal gap in the public health sphere.
II. THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT AND
THE CORPUS OF ANTI-DISCRIMINATION
LEGISLATION
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 199080 (ADA) and the
corpus of anti-discrimination legislation" appear to be unlikely
76. Adult Entertainment Ctr. v. Pierce County, 788 P.2d at 1106 (citing Wall Distrib.
Inc. v. City of Newport News, 782 F.2d 1165 (4th Cir. 1986)).
77. Eg., City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, 475 U.S. 1132 (1986) reh'g denied, 475
U.S. 1132 (1986).
78. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
79. Suburban Video v. City of Delafield, 694 F. Supp. 585, 592 (E.D. Wis. 1988) (hold-
ing that licensing requirements that do not further substantial government interest contra-
vene constitutional rights); Broadway Books v. Roberts, 642 F. Supp. 486, 494-95 (E.D.
Tenn. 1986) (holding unconstitutional a 30 day residence requirement that does not demon-
strate a compelling state interest and a good moral character requirement which permits
unguided discretion to licensing authority); but see Centaur, Inc. v. Richland County, S.C.,
392 S.E.2d 165 (S.C. 1990) (upholding constitutionality of licensing requirement, but permit-
ting denial of license under enumerated circumstances such as failure to provide "reasonably
necessary information").
80. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101-12201 (1992) (es-
tablished a clear and comprehensive prohibition of discrimination of the basis of disability).
81. The ADA does not repeal the body of anti-discrimination legislation that preceded
it. The Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973 proscribes discrimination of persons with "handi-
caps" (defined almost identically to "disability") by entities which are in receipt of federal
financial assistance and does not reach into the purely private sector. The principle applica-
tion of the Rehabilitation Act in the post-ADA era will be to protect disabled employees of
the federal government, since they are not covered by the ADA (§ 101(5)(B)(i)).
Discrimination against persons with disabilities in housing is dealt with under the Federal
Fair Housing Amendments of 1988. Sec Baxter v. Belleville, 1989 U.S.D.C. LEXIS 10298
(S.D. I 11.1989).
The Education for All Handicapped Children Act, 20 U.S.C. para. 1400 et seq., gives all
school aged handicapped children the right to a free public education in the least restrictive
19931
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sources of law to fill the doctrinal void left by deferential constitu-
tional standards. Anti-discrimination law, on its face, is concerned
with what I will refer to as "pure discrimination." Pure discrimina-
tion occurs when a public or private entity treats a person unfairly,
not because she lacks adequate skill, qualifications, or experience,
but because of her disability. The primary goal of the ADA, then,
is to assure equality of opportunity, full participation, equal living
and self-sufficiency to allow people with disabilities to compete on
an equal basis.82
Public health regulation of communicable disease does not fit
comfortably within the ADA's rubric of pure discrimination. Cer-
tainly, the annals of public health are replete with examples of pure
discrimination against "discrete and insular" minorities such as
prostitutes, 3 drug dependent people, 4 gays,8 and racial minori-
ties. 6 The exercise of public health powers such as testing, screen-
ing, reporting, vaccination, treatment, isolation and quarantine are,
however, qualitatively different than the ADA's paradigm of pure
discrimination: the state is regulating public health, not withdraw-
ing jobs, benefits or services because of a disability; here, the motive
is health related, not grounded in prejudice; and the usual qualifica-
tion standards of education, skill, or experience are not pertinent.
Persons are treated unequally in public health regulation because of
communicable medical conditions, not as a direct result of pure
prejudice.
When a health department exercises public health powers, the
pivotal issue is whether it must comply with the standards of the
ADA. Despite the qualitative differences between a communicable
disease (e.g., tuberculosis, syphilis, or hepatitis B), and a physical
disability (e.g., sight, hearing, or mobility impairments), the ADA
applies to each equally. Certainly, the actions of health depart-
ments that directly affect the opportunities of persons with commu-
nicable diseases in employment and in public accommodations are
environment appropriate to their needs. See Martinez v. Sch. Bd. of Hillsburough Cty, Fla.
861 F.2d 1502 (11th Cir. 1988), reversing, 711 F. Supp. 1293 (M D Fla. 1989); Community
High School Dist. v. Denz, 124 Ill. App. 3d 1291, 463 N.E. 2d 998 (2d Dist. Il1, 1984)
(legislation and the judicial decisions construing them are referred to as the corpus of anti-
discrimination law).
82. PL 101-336, § 2(a)(8), (9).
83. See ALLAN M.BRANDT, No MAGIC BULLET: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF VENEREAL
DISEASE IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1880 (1985).
84. See generally, DONALD F. MuSrO, M.D., THE AMERICAN DISEASE: ORIGINS OF
NARCOTIC CONTROL (1973).
85. BAYER, supra note 59.
86. See Jew Ho v. Williamson, 103 F. 10 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1900).
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covered under Titles I and III respectively. If a health department
required testing for disease or exclusion from a job in schools, hos-
pitals, food service establishment or day care, it would undoubtedly
have to comply with the standards in Title I of the ADA; the pri-
vate entity in testing or excluding workers would be simply enforc-
ing a state requirement. Similarly, if the health department
required testing or exclusion of workers or residents in a public ac-
commodation, it would have to comply with the standards in Title
III of the ADA. Since public accommodation is defined to include
health care providers, hospitals, day care centers, social services es-
tablishments, schools, and other entities traditionally regulated by
health departments,87 it is clear that ADA standards would apply.
It could be argued, however, that the ADA does not apply to
health department regulations that do not directly affect opportuni-
ties in employment and public accommodations. The exercise of
traditional public health powers such as screening, vaccination, re-
porting, contact tracing, and isolation are not specifically mentioned
in the ADA. Title II (public services) does not refer to the exercise
of police powers; exercising the authority of the state to protect
public health, it can be argued, is not a "public service."
There are several reasons for the assertion in this essay that Title
II does govern the exercise of traditional public health powers.
Generally speaking, the exercise of traditional public health powers
is a service provided to the public by health departments. The ser-
vice is designed to protect the public and that protection is achieved
both by voluntary and involuntary participation in public health
programs. Any time a health department exercises compulsory
powers it also expends resources, provides services, and protects the
community. For example, the state buys and distributes vaccines
and provides treatment and care for persons in isolation.
Moreover, it would be a bizarre reading of the ADA to make
rigid distinctions among the various activities of government.
When the state provides a service or benefit to a person, such as
Medicare or food stamps, it undoubtedly has to do so in a non-
discriminatory manner. The most striking example of this require-
ment was the recent denial of a Medicaid waiver to the State of
Oregon when its proposed health plan discriminated against per-
sons with disabilities. The original plan consistently rated the qual-
ity of life of persons with disabilities lower than that of non-disabled
persons. Consequently, services provided to persons with disabili-
87. See 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (1992).
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ties were systematically placed in low (unlikely to be covered) posi-
tions on the priority list. The plan was found to violate the ADA. 8
Following revision to reflect ADA concerns, Oregon received its
waiver.
Likewise, when a state exercises coercive powers with the poten-
tial to seriously affect a person's liberty, autonomy, or privacy, it
should have the same obligation to follow the non-discrimination
principles in the ADA. The exercise of public health powers is a
substantial part of the functions of health departments. If Congress
had intended to carve out, or exclude, these functions from the cov-
erage of the ADA, it would have done so expressly and clearly.
Principles of parallel construction in the legislation also militate
towards inclusion of public health powers. If a government depart-
ment deprives an infected health care worker of a job, excludes a
child from school, or refuses a medical license based upon a per-
son's disease status, it clearly is covered. It seems inconceivable
that if the same, or another government agency, coerces the individ-
ual or even deprives the person of liberty on the basis of a disease
status, that the ADA does not apply. Such a tortuous construction
would have to posit that Congress required health departments to
act in a non-discriminatory manner when it withheld a small benefit
or service, but not when it deprived a person of liberty.
Indeed, a great deal of evidence exists in Title II to suggest that
its provisions apply to the exercise of traditional public health pow-
ers. The definition of "public entity" at 42 U.S.C. § 12131 expressly
includes state and local governments. The definition squarely in-
cludes health department activities. Further, this section defines
"qualified individual with a disability" to include eligibility to par-
ticipate in programs or activities provided by a public entity. The
"activities" of a health department assuredly include disease
control.
Finally, 42 U.S.C. § 12132 contemplates coverage for persons
who are subjected to the "activities" of a public entity, or "discrimi-
nation by any such entity." Discrimination by a health department
would certainly include the exercise of compulsion against a person
with a communicable disease without sufficient justification based
upon a significant risk to the public. A public health department
ought to be held to the same standard in exercising public health
88. Letter from Louis W. Sullivan, Secretary, U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, to Barbara Roberts, Governor of Oregon (Aug. 7, 1992); Richard A. Knox, U.S.
Rejects Oregon Health Care Plan, Boston Globe, Sept. 4, 1992, at 3. The Oregon plan, fol-
lowing revision to comply with the ADA, received its waiver.
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powers as it is in employment or accommodations-grounding poli-
cies in facts and not in irrational fears about persons with
disabilities.
The Department of Justice (DOJ) regulations relating to state
and local government services also appear to cover the exercise of
public health powers. s9 The DOJ sees its jurisdiction within the
context of the "ADA's expanded coverage of state and local govern-
ment operations."'  It will exercise complaints against agencies and
other governmental components carrying out their "functions," in-
cluding state medical boards. The DOJ's jurisdiction extends ex-
pressly to "all programs, services, and regulatory activities" relating
to "public safety" and "all other government functions not assigned
to other designated agencies." 91 Title II, therefore, covers "all ac-
tions of state and local governments" 92 which squarely include the
exercise of their compulsory powers.
DOJ regulations under Title II liberally discuss individualized
assessment and "direct threat standards" for tuberculosis and other
communicable diseases. 9s To demonstrate the applicability of the
ADA to communicable disease, the relevant definitions, legislative
history, and standards are analyzed.94
A. Communicable Disease as a Disability
1. "Physical or mental impairment"
Disability is defined broadly in the ADA to mean "a physical or
mental impairment that substantially9" limits one or more of the
major life activities,96 a record of such impairment, or being re-
garded as having such an impairment."97 "Physical or mental im-
89. Dept. of Justice Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in State and Local
Government Services Final Rule, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,694 (1991) (codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 35).
90. 28 C.F.R. pt 35, subpt. G (1993).
91. Id.
92. Id. at subpt. A.
93. Il
94. As above.
95. The physical or mental impairment must substantially limit a major life activity.
Persons with minor or trivial impairments' such as a simple infected finger are not disabled
within the meaning of the Act. See, SENATE COMMITrEE ON LABOR AND HUMAN RE-
SOURCES, S. Doc. No. 116, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1989).
96. Id. (Che term "physical or mental impairment" does not include simple physical
characteristics, such as blue eyes or black hair. Nor does it include environmental, cultural,
and economic disadvantages in and of themselves. Thus age and homosexuality are not char-
acterized as disabilities under the Act.)
97. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (1992). The definition of disability in the ADA is comparable
to the term "handicap" in section 7(8)(B) of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and § 802(h) of
1993]
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pairment" includes: (1) any physiological disorder or condition,
disfigurement or anatomical loss affecting any of the major bodily
systems; or (2) any mental or physiological disorder such as mental
retardation or mental illness. The legislative history9" as well as the
prior case law,99 make clear that "disability" includes diseases and
infections which are communicable (e.g., tuberculosis,"°° hepati-
tis, 101 and HIVI0 2) as well as those which are not (e.g., cancer, 1 3
heart disease, 104 arthritis,"0 5 diabetes, and epilepsy" 6).
the Fair Housing Act. The Congress intended that regulations implementing the Rehabilita-
tion Act and the Fair Housing Amendments apply to the term disability in the ADA. The
use of the term "disability" instead of "handicap" represents currently acceptable terminol-
ogy. See also, THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1989: REPORT OF THE COM-
MITtEE ON LABOR AND HUMAN SERVICES, S. Rep. No. 116, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1992).
98. Id. at 22. Indeed, the House Energy and Commerce Committee rejected an amend-
ment offered by Congressman Dannemeyer that would have expressly excluded currently
contagious and sexually transmitted diseases or infections from the definitions of "disability."
See HOUSE COMM1IIEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong.,
Sess. 4 (1990) (to accompany H.R. 2273).
99. See, e.g., Strathie v. Dep't of Transp., 716 F.2d 227, 232-34 (3d Cir. 1983) (holding
that hearing impairment problems are to be treated as disabilities); Doe v. N.Y. Univ., 666
F.2d 761, 775 (2d Cir. 1981) (arguing that psychiatric problems are majority life activities
which are properly classified as handicaps).
100. See School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987) (school teacher with tuberculosis was
handicapped within the meaning of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973).
101. New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 612 F.2d 644 (2d Cir. 1979)
(mentally retarded children who are carriers of serum hepatitis B could not be excluded from
public school because they were handicapped and did not pose a health hazard); Jeffrey S, a
minor by Ernest S., his father v. State Bd. of Educ. of Georgia, 896 F.2d 507 (1 th Cir. 1990)
(ordering trial on the merits in case involving alleged exclusion from school because, inter
alia, child was a carrier of hepatitis B); Lussier v. Dugger, 904 F.2d 661 (11th Cir. 1990)
(Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 applied respectively to corrections officer who alleged
discrimination because he had infectious hepatitis disease); Kohl v. Woodhaven Learning
Center, 865 F.2d 930 (8th Cir. 1989), reversing in part, 672 F. Supp. 1221 (W.D. M.O. 1987)
(inoculation of school staff for hepatitis not a "reasonable accommodation.")
102. See, e.g., Doe v. Centinela Hosp., 57 U.S.L.W. 2034 (C.D. Cal. 1988); Chalk v. U.S.
Dist. Ct., 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988).
103. EEOC v. AIC Security Investigations, Ltd., 823 F. Supp. 571 (N.D.Ill. 1993)
(awarding a security company executive $272,000 in damages, reflecting judicial reduction to
statutory cap, when employer terminated him following diagnosis of brain cancer that did not
affect his job performance).
104. See Bey v. Bolger, 540 F. Supp. 910 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (post office employee sought
reinstatement but was denied because of his hypertension).
105. School Bd. of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 283 (1987) citing 118
Cong. Rec. 36761 (1972) (statement of Sen. Mondale) ("a woman 'crippled by arthritis' was
denied a job not because she could not do the work but because college trustees [thought]
normal students shouldn't see her").
106. The Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee Report on the ADA cited ex-
amples of individuals with controlled diabetes or epilepsy who were "often denied jobs for
which they are qualified." Such denials are the result of negative attitudes and misinforma-
tion. See S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1990). In addition, in an appendix to the
regulations on the Rehabilitation Act, the Department of Health and Human Services specifi-
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The legislative history of the Rehabilitation Act barely mentions
infectious disease. 107 In Arline, the question arose for the first time
in the Supreme Court whether discrimination on the basis of conta-
giousness constitutes discrimination "by reason of... handicap."10 8
The Court held that a teacher who had been hospitalized with tu-
berculosis that affected her respiratory system had a "record" of
substantial physical impairment. The fact that a person with a rec-
ord of impairment is also contagious does not remove her from pro-
tection as a handicapped person.
The Arline Court observed that, in defining a handicapped per-
son, the contagious effects of a disease cannot be meaningfully dis-
tinguished from the disease's physical effects. "It would be unfair
to allow an employer to seize upon the distinction between the ef-
fects of a disease on others and the effects of a disease on a patient
and use that distinction to justify discriminatory treatment." 1"
Citing the example of cosmetic disfigurement, the Court argued that
Congress was as concerned about the effects of impairment on
others as it was about its effects on the individual. °
The inclusion of contagious conditions in the definition of hand-
icap was, according to Arline, consistent with the basic purpose of
disability law to protect people against the prejudiced attitudes and
ignorance of others. "Society's accumulated myths and fears about
disability and disease are as handicapping as are the physical limita-
tions that flow from... impairment. Few aspects of... a handicap
give rise to the same level of public fear and misapprehension as
contagiousness.""1 '
2. "Record" of or "regarded" as being impaired
A person is disabled if he or she has a "record" of or is "re-
garded" as being disabled or is perceived to be disabled, even if
there is no actual incapacity.1" 2 A "record" indicates that the per-
cally listed a number of diseases to which the Act applied, including epilepsy, cerebral palsy,
muscular dystrophy, multiple sclerosis, cancer, heart disease, and diabetes. 45 C.F.R. 84,
App. A at 377 (1985).
107. School Board of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 297 (1987) (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting).
108. See, eg., Lower Courts had already found that contagious diseases were handicaps.
See eg., New York State Ass'n of Retarded Children v. Carey, 612 F.2d 644 (2d Cir. 1979).
109. School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. at 282 (1987).
110. Id. at 283.
111. Id. at 284.
112. This concept derives from Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397
(1979).
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son has had a history of impairment, or has been misclassified as
having had an impairment. This provision is designed to protect
persons who have recovered from a disability or disease which pre-
viously impaired their life activities.113 By including those who
have a record of impairment, Congress acknowledged that people
who have recovered from diseases such as epilepsy or cancer face
discrimination based upon prejudice and irrational fear.114
The term "regarded" as being impaired includes individuals
who do not have limitations in their major life functions, but are
treated as if they did. This concept protects people who are dis-
criminated against in the false belief that they are disabled. It
would be inequitable for a defendant who intended to discriminate
on the basis of disability to successfully raise the defense that the
person was not, in fact, disabled. This provision is particularly im-
portant for individuals who are perceived to have stigmatic condi-
tions that are viewed negatively by society. It is the reaction of
society, rather than the disability itself, which deprives the person
of equal enjoyment of rights and services. Persons with infectious
diseases are particularly prone to irrational fears by those who are
misinformed about the modes and relative risks of transmission.
Persons with disfiguring conditions such as leprosy or severe burns
may also suffer from negative attitudes and misinformation because
they are perceived to be disabled.11
3. Asymptomatic infection as a disability
The fact that a record or perception of disability is included
within the ADA is vitally important in determining whether pure
asymptomatic infection can be regarded as a disability. The abiding
interest at the time of Arline was whether an asymptomatic carrier
of a contagious infection such as HIV could be regarded as handi-
capped. A Justice Department memorandum in June 1986 con-
cluded that while the disabling effects of AIDS may constitute a
handicap, contagiousness-the ability to transmit infection to
others-is not a potential characteristic.11 6 The Arline court in its
widely studied footnote 7 claimed that the facts of the case "do not
113. Senate Report (Labor and Human Resources Committee) No. 101-116, Aug. 30,
1989 (to accompany S. 933), p. 23.
114. School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. at 284 (1987).
115. Senate Report (Labor and Human services Committee) No. 101-116, Aug. 30, 1989
(to accompany S. 933, p.24).
116. Opinion of Charles J. Cooper, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel,
for Ronald E. Robertson, General Counsel, Department of Health and Human Services, June
23, 1986.
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present, and we therefore do not reach, the question whether a car-
rier of a contagious disease such as AIDS could be considered to
have a physical impairment."' 17
On July 29, 1988, C. Everett Koop, the Surgeon General, wrote
to the Justice Department seeking a fresh opinion in light of Arline
and the growing scientific understanding that HIV infection is the
starting point of a single disease process.1 8 In response, the Justice
Department withdrew its previous opinion, concluding that "sec-
tion 504 protects symptomatic as well as asymptomatic HIV-in-
fected individuals against discrimination." The person is protected
only if he or she "is able to perform the duties of the job and does
not constitute a direct threat to the health or safety of others."" 19
The applicability of asymptomatic infection to handicapped sta-
tus had already been clarified in amendments to the Rehabilitation
Act. The Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987,120 intended as a
codification of Arline, states that a person with a contagious disease
or infection is handicapped if he or she does not "constitute a direct
threat to health or safety" and is able to "perform the duties of the
job."'' Since Arline, the courts have consistently held that HIV-
related diseases, including asymptomatic HIV infection, are covered
handicaps. 122
B. Direct Threat: An Evolving Qualification Standard
1. Applicability of the "direct threat" standard to all parts of
the ADA.
The anti-discrimination principle in the ADA applies only to
"qualified individuals."' 123 A "qualified" person must be capable of
meeting all of the performance or eligibility criteria for the particu-
lar position, service or benefit. 2 There is, moreover, an affirmative
117. Id. at 282, n. 7.
118. Letter from C. Everett Koop to Douglas Kamiec, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral, July 29, 1988.
119. Memorandum for Arthur B. Culvahouse, Jr., Counsel to the President, from Doug-
las W. Kamiec, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Legal Counsel, re Applica-
tion of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act to HIV-Infected Individuals, Sept. 27, 1988.
The concept of "direct threat" as a qualification standard is discussed below.
120. Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C).
121. Id. at § 9(c).
122. See eg., Centinela Hosp., 57 U.S.L.W. 2034 (D.C. Cal. 1988). See also, Lawrence
Gostin, The AIDS Litigation Project: A National Review of Court and Human Rights Com-
mission Decisions, Part II: Discrimination, 263 JAMA 2086-93 (1990).
123. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112, 12133 (1992).
124. Id. § 12112 (requiring qualification standards, employment tests, or other selection
HEALTH MATRIX
obligation to provide "reasonable accommodations '  or "reason-
able modifications" '126 if they would enable the person to meet the
performance or eligibility criteria. Employers are not required to
provide reasonable accommodations if it would impose an undue
hardship on the operation of the business. 127
The key concepts of "qualification" and "reasonable accommo-
dations" or "modifications", on their face, apply only to a person's
ability to do a job or participate in public programs, with or without
adaptations or modifications by the employer or public entity. A
specific ban against discrimination of disabled people who are
"qualified," without better established limits, might require covered
entities to integrate persons in jobs, accommodations, and services,
even if they posed a risk of transmission of disease. This prospect
led some Congressmen to ask whether employers could be required
to employ persons with AIDS if they risked "exposing others to
tuberculosis, cytomegalovirus, and other AIDS-associated
illness?" 128
AIDS-related conditions provide poor examples because of the
low risk of transmission. It does, however, defy established public
health practice to suggest that persons with readily transmissible
air-borne conditions could not be excluded from a particular job or
enclosed public spaces such as movie theaters; that persons with
food-borne diseases could not be prevented from working as a
waiter in restaurants or kitchens; or that public health departments
could not set reasonable rules for the control of sexually transmitted
disease in bathhouses. In short, the essence of public health regula-
tion is that persons may be treated differently based upon a rigorous
scientific assessment of the risk of transmission.
Congress anticipated this problem in relation to employment
and public accommodations. Titles I and IV of the ADA state ex-
pressly that qualification standards can include a requirement that a
person with a disability "not pose a direct threat to the health or
criteria to be "job-related" and "consistent with business necessity"). See also, Id. at § 12133
(requiring the disabled person to meet the "essential eligibility requirements" for the receipt
of services or the participation in programs or activities).
125. Id. § 12111(b)(5).
126. Id. § 12111(2).
127. Id. at § 102(b)(5)(A). See also, Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S.
397, 410-12 (1979) (holding that "unique financial and administrative burdens" or require-
ments which call for "fundamental alteration in the nature of the program" impose undue
hardships on businesses).
128. William Dannemeyer, Joseph Barton, & Donald Ritter, House Report (Energy and
Commerce Committee) No. 101-485 (IV), May 15, 1990 (to accompany H.R. 2273), p. 126.
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safety of others" '29 if reasonable accommodations or modifications
will not eliminate that direct threat. The ADA clearly provides a
right to take action to protect the health and safety of all persons in
employment and public accommodations.
130
The question arises as to whether the same standard is similarly
applicable to Title II, since the concept of "direct threat" is not
expressly extended to public services. Title II is of seminal impor-
tance in the regulation of public health since it is concerned with
activities of state and local government. If taken at face value, Title
II could appear to undermine rules, regulations and practices of
public health departments which exclude persons from services,
programs, or activities because of a communicable disease. A de-
fense of direct threat is not expressly available under Title II. As
Congress likely did not intend such a result, future regulations
should specifically apply the "direct threat" standard to Title II.
Title II applies only to "qualified" individuals. Although that
term is not defined in Title II, it can reasonably be taken to have the
same meaning as in Title I. Indeed, in discussing the qualification
standards for public services, the House Committee on Energy and
Commerce referred to the long-standing section 504 principle that a
person must meet the basic eligibility requirements of the program,
and could not pose "a significant risk... [to the health or safety of
others] that . . . [cannot] be eliminated by reasonable
accommodation." 131
2. Defining "direct threat": How significant must health
risks be?
By utilizing the Supreme Court's term "direct threat," Congress
intended to codify Arline.132 Although the "direct threat" criterion
was limited to persons with contagious disease in the Senate bill, it
was extended in Conference to all individuals with disabilities.
133
The ADA defines "direct threat" consistently with the Arline deci-
sion: "a significant risk to the health or safety of others" that can-
129. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12113(b), 12182(b)(3).
130. See H.R. REP. No. 596, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1990) (allowing drug testing of
employees in safety-sensitive positions in order to protect lawful exercises of businesses).
131. H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1990).
132. See Id. at 26,51-52 (1990), Id. at pt. 2, 121. (The term "direct threat" is also found
in the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1988 and the Fair Housing Amendments of 1988).
133. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 596, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1990); H.R. REP. No. 485,
101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, 51 (indicating that in the House, the standard of "direct threat"
was extended by the Judiciary Committee to all individuals with disabilities, and not simply
to those with contagious diseases or infection).
HEALTH MATRIX
not be eliminated by reasonable accommodation in employment,1 34
or reasonable modification of policies, practices, or procedures,
or by the provision of auxiliary aids or devices in public
accommodations. 135
"Significant risk" therefore, becomes the standard against which
public health regulation must now be measured. The question now
becomes which risks are significant? It is possible to arrive at a
rather sophisticated jurisprudential and public health understand-
ing of the concept of significant risk by piecing together the lan-
guage in Arline and the ADA's rich legislative history.
First, determination of significant risk becomes a public health
inquiry. 136 Relevant evidence must be provided by the multiple dis-
ciplines of public health, including medicine, virology, bacteriology,
and epidemiology. The science of public health provides the sole
grounding for determinations of modes of transmission, probability
levels for transmission, efficacy of policies and practices for inter-
rupting transmission, and the likelihood and severity of risk. Disa-
bility law has been thoughtfully crafted to replace reflexive actions
based upon irrational fears, speculation, stereotypes, or pernicious
mythologies,137 with carefully reasoned judgements based upon well
established scientific information. 138
Second, significant risk must be determined on a case-by-case
basis, and not under any type of blanket rule, generalization about a
class of disabled persons, or assumptions about the nature of dis-
ease. This requires a fact-specific individualized inquiry resulting in
a "well-informed judgement grounded in a careful and open-minded
134. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(3). See also, H.R. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1989)
(suggesting that direct threat to property may also be sufficient).
135. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(3) (1992).
136. See eg., H.R. Rep. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1990) (to accompany H.R.
2273) (House Judiciary Committee indicating that direct threat must be based on objective
and accepted public health guidelines).
137. The legislative history is replete with statements that rejecting decision making
based upon ignorance, misperceptions, and patronizing attitudes. See, LABOR AND HUMAN
RESOURCES COMMITTEE REPORT, S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1989) (accom-
panying S. 933); H.R. Rep. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 52,153 (1990) (accompanying H.R.
2273); pp. 52, 153; HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, H.R. REP. No. 485,
at 38; House Committee on Education and Labor, H.R. REP. No.485 (II) at 77, 121. For
historical works of excellence which chronicle the invidious discrimination and prejudiced
attitudes toward illness and disease see, e.g., SUSAN SONTAG, ILLNESS AS A METAPHOR
(1986); ALLAN BRANDT, No MAGIC BULLET: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF VENEREAL DISEASE
IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1880 (1985); Dell, Social Dimensions of Epilepsy: Stigma and
Response, in PSYCHOPATHOLOGY IN EPILEPSY 185-10 (S. Whitman & B. Hermann, eds.,
1986).
138. School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 285 (1987).
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weighing of risks and alternatives." '139 A specific determination
must be made that the person is in fact a carrier of a communicable
disease and that the disease is readily transmissible in the environ-
ment in which he or she will be situated. In the context of behav-
ioral risks, the specific conduct must be identified and credible
evidence must be provided to the effect that the person is likely to
engage in the dangerous behavior. For example, if a mentally ill or
mentally retarded person were to be excluded from school or a job
because he or she posed a "direct threat," objective evidence must
be presented from the commission of recent dangerous acts.'4° If a
person with a needle-borne or sexually transmitted infection were to
be denied equal employment or housing opportunities, evidence of a
likelihood that the person would share needles or engage in sexual
activity in that setting must be offered.
Third, the risk must be "significant," not speculative, theoreti-
cal, or remote. The ADA sets a "clear, defined standard which re-
quires actual proof of significant risk to others." 141 This is derived
from the highly regarded footnote 16 in Arline: 42 "A person who
poses a significant risk of communicating an infectious disease to
others in the workplace will not be otherwise qualified for his or her
job if reasonable accommodation will not eliminate that risk." The
Court illustrated its point by observing that a school board would
not be required to place a teacher with active, contagious tuberculo-
sis with elementary school children.
Several distinct issues emerge from the concept of significant
risk: what is the standard of proof, who bears the burden of proof,
and what level of risk is required? Court cases and legislative his-
tory do not provide definitive answers, but some guidance can be
offered. The standard of proof goes to the issue of the probative
value of evidence required. The standard of proof ought to be based
upon clear and convincing evidence. The public health position
taken should be consistent with the clear weight of scientific evi-
dence. Restrictions on liberty ought not be based upon a minority
medical opinion. A single physician's view, for example, that HIV
might be transmitted casually or from a bite is not sufficiently per-
suasive when compared with all the accumulated scientific evidence
139. Hall v. U.S. Postal Service, 857 F.2d 1073, 1079 (6th Cir. 1988) quoting Arline, 480
U.S. 273 (1977). See also, Mantolete v. Bolger, 757 F.2d 1416 (9th Cir. 1985); Strathe v.
Dept. of Transp., 716 F.2d 227 (3d Cir. 1983).
140. H.R. REP. No. 485 AT 52; S. REP. No. 116 at 27,77.
141. H.R. REP. No. 485 at 53.
142. School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. at 287.
HEALTH MATRIX
data. 4 3 The proof of risk, on the other hand, need not be conclu-
sive or decisive. "Little in science can be proved with complete cer-
tainty, and section 504 does not require such a test."' 44
The burden ofproof should fall on the entity seeking to demon-
strate significant risk. This is consistent with the fact that "direct
threat" is a defense in Title V Thus, an employer, public health
department, or public accommodation must be able to offer evi-
dence substantiating its decision to treat disabled people inequitably
because they pose a threat to others. It would be difficult, if not
impossible, for a person with a communicable disease to prove that
transmission cannot occur or is unlikely to occur.
The level of risk required is an imponderable because the con-
cept of "significant" is elastic and may vary depending upon the
circumstances and severity of the outcome. For example, minor or
inconsequential infections might require a higher risk of transmis-
sion than lethal or fatal infections. Significant risk is not a remote
risk, possibly not even an "elevated risk."' 146 There must be a mate-
rial, real, or substantial possibility that the disease can be
transmitted.
The factors to be used in determining significant risk are in-
creasingly well understood. 47 The decision maker must determine
significant risk based upon reasonable medical judgements and the
current state of scientific understanding concerning:
(a) Mode of transmission. The mechanism of transmission of
most diseases is well established by epidemiologic research. A sig-
nificant risk should be based upon a primary mode of transmission,
not a mode which is unestablished or highly inefficient. A blood-
borne disease, for example, could conceivably be transmitted
143. A Maryland court has demonstrated increasing reliance on scientific data, holding
that information on AIDS transmission from reputable scientific journals and institutions
constituted a proper object for judicial notice. Faya v. Almarez, 629 A.2d 327 (Md. 1993).
144. Chalk v. US District Court, 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988).
145. While the "direct threat" standard is not framed as a defense in Title III, it is rea-
sonable to conclude that Congress intended that the public accommodation should bear the
burden of substantiating a direct threat.
146. H.R. Rep. No. 485 at 53 (stating that the decision to exclude cannot be based on
merely "an elevated risk of injury").
147. The following discussion is based upon the amicus curiae brief of the American
Medical Association in Arline, and the discussions in several of my previous works. See
Larry Gostin, The Politics of AIDS: Compulsory State Powers, Public Health and Civil Liber-
ties, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1017, 1020-26 (1989); Larry Gostin, Hospitals, Health Care Profession-
als and AIDS The "Right to Know" the Health Status of Professionals and Patients, 48 MD.
L. REV. 12, 15-24 (1989); Larry Gostin, The Case Against Compulsory Casefinding in Con-
trolling AIDS Testing, Screening and Reporting, 12 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 21-24 (1986).
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through a bite,148 through rough play among children,149 or by
bleeding into food. 150 Yet, the "significant risk" test would not be
met if personal restrictions were based upon such speculative mech-
anisms of transmission.
(b) Duration of risk. A person can be subject to compulsory
public health powers only if he or she is actually contagious, and
only for the period of time of contagiousness. A fundamental prin-
ciple of public health law,151 often breached in early cases, 152 is the
requirement that the subject must be proven by medical examina-
tion or testing to be carrying an infectious agent. "The mere possi-
bility that persons may have been exposed [to a disease] is not
sufficient... They must have been exposed to it, and the conditions
actually exist for a communication of contagion." 153 The person
must also be actively infectious. The key factual determination in
Arline was whether a teacher was actively contagious and currently
capable of transmitting tuberculosis through casual contact.154
(c) Probability of risk. The authority of the public health de-
partment to impose restrictions grows as the probability of the risk
of transmission increases. The probability that a person will trans-
mit disease is a scientific calculation that can be made with relative
degrees of confidence. The range of probability that a person will
contract HBV or HIV from a percutaneous exposure (e.g., a needle-
stick or cut), for example, is well established by prospective stud-
ies.1 55 The level of risk from a single sexual relationship is much
148. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 846 F.2d 1163 (8th Cir. 1988), affirming, 669 F.
Supp. 289 (D. Minn. 1987) (holding that the mouth and teeth of an HIV infected person
could be regarded as a "dangerous" or "deadly weapon."); Indiana v. Haines, 545 N.E. 2d
834 (Ind. App. 2d Dist. 1989) (reinstating a conviction for "attempted murder" for splat-
tering emergency workers with HIV-contaminated blood).
149. See, eg., Thomas v. Atascadero Unif. School Dist., 662 F. Supp. 376 (C.D. Cal.
1986) (holding it unlawful to exclude an HIV-infected kindergartner who bit another child
and was labelled "aggressive").
150. See, e.g., People v. Dunn, Florida Crim. Case, Assoc. Press release, Sept. 28, 1987
reported in Larry Gostin et al., THE AIDS LITIGATION PROJECT, U.S. Govt. Printing Office:
Washington D.C. (1990) (convicting prisoner of introducing "contraband" into a state facil-
ity by lacing guards' coffee with HIV-contaminated blood). See further discussion of food
workers infra § 4.
151. See Lawrence Gostin, The Future of Public Health Law, 12 AM. J.L. & MED. 461,
467 (1986) (discussing a series of cases with regard to this principle).
152. Id. at 480-83; ex parte Company, 139 N.E. 204 (1922).
153. Smith v. Emery, 11 A.D. 10, 42 N.Y.S. 258 (1896).
154. Arline, 480 U.S. at 287, n.16.
155. The range of risk for HIV transmission following a needle stick is between 0.03 to
0.9%, compared with 12-17% for HBV transmission. See Lawrence Gostin, Hospitals,
Health Care Professionals, and AIDS: The "Right to Know" the Health Status of Professionals
and Patients, 12 MD. L. REv. at 17.
1993]
HEALTH MATRIX
more difficult to calculate. Substantial probabilities of transmission
based upon firm scientific calculations provide the best justification
for public health powers.
(d) Severity of Harm. The seriousness of harm to third parties
represents an important calculation in public health regulations. In
assessing the validity of public health powers, a rough inverse corre-
lation exists between the seriousness of harm and the probability of
it occurring. As the seriousness of potential harm to the commu-
nity rises, the level of risk needed to justify the public health power
decreases.
Central to the understanding of the "significant risk" criterion is
the fact that even the most serious potential for harm does not jus-
tify public health regulation in the absence of a reasonable
probability that it will occur. Parents of school children, for exam-
ple, have difficulty comprehending why courts would uphold the
exclusion of children from school who are infested with lice, but not
those infected with HIV. The reason is that a very high probability
exists that other children will become infested with lice, but that the
risk of contracting HIV in that setting is highly remote.
The interaction between probability and severity of risk emerges
as a pointedly unresolved issue at the interface of disability law and
public health regulation. Consider the application of the "direct
threat" standard to an HIV infected health care professional.1 56
While the risk of transmitting infection to the professional's patients
is highly remote, the consequence to any patient infected is grave.
Courts are simply unprepared to respond to this dilemma by the
application of a rational set of standards.
The Leckelt case showed a fundamental misunderstanding of
the relationship between probability and severity of risk by conclud-
ing that even though the probability of HIV transmission "may be
extremely low ... there is no cure for HIV or AIDS at this time,
and the potential harm of HIV infection is extremely high."1 57 If
the seriousness of harm were dispositive it would require courts to
uphold almost any restriction on a person with AIDS even if the
156. See generally, Larry Gostin, HIV-infected Physicians and the Practice of Secondary
Invasive Procedures, 19 HASTINGS CrR. RP. 32, 32-39 (1989).
157. Leckelt v. Board of Comm'ns of Hosp. Dist. No. 1, 909 F2d 820, 1990 U.S. App.
LEXIS 14852, at 28-29 (5th Cir. 1990). The Court relied more on the fact that Kevin Leckelt
refused to follow infection control policy by reporting his contagious conditions and submit-
ting to HIV testing. This led the Court to conclude that the reason for his dismissal was not
solely his handicap. Query, would the Court's decision be affected by the ADA language
which does not use the word "solely" by reason of his or her disability?
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risk were "low, approaching zero.' 158
Again in Behringer the court concluded that "(w)here the ulti-
mate harm is death, even the presence of a low risk of transmission
justifies the adoption of a policy which precludes invasive proce-
dures when there is 'any' risk of transmission."' 151 There, an oto-
laryngologist was diagnosed with AIDS at the hospital where he
enjoyed surgical privileges. The hospital failed to maintain confi-
dentiality of the diagnosis and employees and other members of the
community learned of the surgeon's condition. The hospital, recog-
nizing the risk, imposed informed consent requirements on the sur-
geon, and suspended then barred surgical privileges for the
surgeon.160
The court held that, under the informed consent doctrine, dis-
closure of the risk from procedures performed by a surgeon with
AIDS was required, as "the ultimate arbiter of whether the patient
is to be treated invasively by an AIDS-positive surgeon... will be
the fully-informed patient."' 6' The court found that the hospital,
while breaching its duty of confidentiality to the surgeon, acted
properly in imposing conditions on the surgeons practice of
medicine at the institution given the "materially enhanced risk"
posed by the surgeon and the hospital's legitimate public health
purpose of preventing the spread of infection.' 62
Likewise, in the more recent Almarez case, the court went a step
further, permitting recovery for two patients' fear of acquiring
AIDS from an HIV-positive surgeon for the period between when
the two patients learned of the surgeon's illness and received their
own HIV-negative test results. There, the two patient's were oper-
ated on by a prominent breast cancer surgeon, and later learned
through news accounts that the surgeon was HIV-positive. 6
3
The court acknowledged that the patients' complaints failed to
identify any actual channel of transmission for the AIDS virus, but
permitted recovery for fear (and its manifestations in headaches and
sleeplessness) nonetheless. The court, however, cut-off recovery for
the patients' continued fear, reasoning that current, credible scien-
tific evidence indicates that 95% of individuals exposed to HIV will
158. Glover v. Eastern Neb. Office of Retardation, 867 F.2d. 461 (8th Cir. 1989) cert.
denied, 110 S.Ct. 321 (1989) (finding HIV screening of staff in mental retardation facility was
unconstitutional because of the exceedingly low risk).
159. Behringer Est. v. Medical Ctr. at Princeton, 592 A.2d 1251, 1283 (1991).
160. Id. at 1254.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1276.
163. Id. at 329.
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test positive for the antibodies to the virus within six months. The
court also found that the HIV-infected surgeon had a duty to warn
patients of the risk, and that the hospital might also be liable, under
the doctrine of agency, for its failure to control risk.164
(e) Human rights burdens. While human rights burdens are
often missing from public health calculations, '65 they are of central
importance. The nature, severity, and duration of the personal re-
strictions must be weighed against the efficacy of the public health
power. Substantial public benefit would be required to justify re-
strictions of great severity and/or duration. A requirement to re-
port an infectious condition to a public health department which
maintained strict confidentiality would not impose significant
human burdens. A short period of exclusion from school due to
infectious measles might similarly be reasonable. On the other
hand, isolation for a disease without a finite period of infectiousness
would be burdensome both in the degree and the duration of human
deprivation. Courts must first determine if the health risk is signifi-
cant. This ought to be followed by a weighing of efficacy (will the
public health power reduce a serious health threat?) and burdens (at
what human, social, and economic cost will the public health bene-
fit be achieved?). '66
3. Medical examination and testing: pre and post-test medical
inquiries
The ADA specifies that the prohibition of discrimination
against persons with disabilities applies to medical examinations
and inquiries. 67 Historically, employers gathered information con-
cerning the applicant's physical and mental condition through ap-
plication forms, interviews, and medical examinations. This
information was often used to exclude persons with disabilities from
employment-particularly applicants with hidden disabilities such
as epilepsy, emotional illness, cancer, or HIV infection. 161
Employers used pre-employment medical information to avoid
hiring persons with disabilities because of bias or misconceptions
about their ability to do the job. As employee health insurance and
164. Faya v. Almarez, 620 A.2d 327 (Md. 1993).
165. The American Medical Association amicus curiae brief in Arline is silent as to the
impact of public health regulation on individual rights.
166. This balancing of benefits and burdens is further explained in Allan Brandt et al.,
Routine Hospital Testing for HIV" Health Policy Considerations, in LAWRENCE GoSTIN,
AIDS AND THE HEALTH CARE SYSTEM, 125-42 (1990).
167. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(c)(2)(B) (1992).
168. See, S. REP. No. 116, supra note 94, at 39.
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benefit costs rose to substantial proportions of their annual operat-
ing costs, employers were driven to screen out persons who might
generate substantial medical bills. Thus, many employers aggres-
sively screened job applicants to avoid paying the health care costs
of persons with potentially expensive medical conditions.
These forms of discrimination, although sometimes understand-
able, have been technically unlawful since the Rehabilitation Act of
1973. Enforcement, however, was exceedingly difficult, since an
employer did not have to disclose that the person's disability was
the sole reason for the failure to hire. So long as employers were
able to conduct extensive medical examinations before offering a
job, they could effectively hide the true reason for the employment
decision.
The ADA's most radical departure from the Rehabilitation Act
is its proscription against pre-offer medical inquiries. 169 Under 42
U.S.C. § 12112(c)(2), employers are prohibited from conducting
medical examinations or inquiries into whether a job applicant is
disabled. Pre-employment inquiries must be limited to assessing the
applicant's ability to perform job-related functions.17 Thus, em-
ployers may not require job applicants to undergo extensive medical
examinations and screenings, including testing for communicable
diseases such as tuberculosis, AIDS, or hepatitis. This will strictly
limit the employer's ability to obtain information about a person's
current and future illness, diseases, or genetic pre-conditions before
a job is offered. From an employer's perspective, it will mean that
he or she will be severely limited in holding down health insurance
costs by seeking to foresee the future health status of applicants.
The ADA permits an employer to require an entrance examina-
tion only after an offer of employment has been made. All entering
employees must be subjected to the same examination and the medi-
cal information must be kept strictly confidential.1 71 Employers
also have very limited rights to conduct medical examinations or
inquiries after a person is hired. The employer cannot compel an
employee to take a medical examination or inquire whether the em-
ployee is disabled unless the examination or inquiry is job related
and consistent with business necessity.1 72
169. For the purposes of the ADA, drug testing is not considered a medical examination,
and employers are not prohibited from taking action against a person who is currently engag-
ing in the alleged use of drugs. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12114, 12210 (1992).
170. Id. § 12112(c)(2)(B).
171. Id. § 12112(c)(3).
172. Id. § 12112(c)(4).
1993]
HEAULTH MATRIX
Congress, in enacting the ADA, recognized that a medical ex-
amination or inquiry that is not job related serves no legitimate em-
ployment purpose, but simply stigmatizes persons with
disabilities.173 The ADA will significantly impede the growing use
of medical testing and information gathering used by employers
across America, transforming the way the business community
makes hiring decisions.
Even though the ADA does not significantly restrict the rights
of insurers (including self-insurers) or companies administering
benefit plans from underwriting risks, employers are not permitted
to deny health insurance or other benefits coverage completely
based on a person's diagnosis, prognosis, or disability. All people
with disabilities must have equal access to the health insurance cov-
erage provided to all employees. Employers, however, may circum-
vent testing restrictions by placing a cap or other limit on coverage
for certain procedures or treatments for conditions such as AIDS.
They may also exclude pre-existing conditions.174
While employers are permitted to establish or change plans
based upon insurance underwriting principles, they are not allowed
to use "subterfuge" to evade the purposes of the ADA (§ 501(c)).' 75
In June of 1993, the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission
(EEOC) issued interim guidance for enforcement of the ADA in
cases of disability-based distinctions in the terms or provisions of
employer-provided health insurance plans. The guidance identifies
four requirements under the ADA in the area of health insurance:
1. disability-based insurance distinctions are permitted only if
the plan is bona fide and if the distinctions are not being used as a
subterfuge for purposes of evading the ADA,
2. decisions about the employment of an individual with a disa-
bility may not be motivated by concerns about the impact of the
individual's disability on the employer's health plan,
3. employees with disabilities must be accorded equal access to
whatever health insurance the employer provides to employees
without disabilities, and
4. an employer may not make an employment decision about
any person, whether or not that person has a disability, because
of concerns about the impact on the health plan of the disability
173. S. REP. No. 116, supra note 142, at 39, 40.
174. Id. at 29.
175. For a more detailed discussion of the antidiscrimination principles that are applica-
ble to health insurance and health benefits packages, see Lawrence Gostin & Alan Widiss,
What's Wrong with the ERISA Vacuum? The Case Against Total Freedom for Employers to
Decide What Coverage Is to be Provided When Risk Retention Plans are Established for
Health Care. 19 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 269 (1993).
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of someone with whom that person has a relationship. 17 6
The Guidance instructs EEOC investigators to determine
whether insurance terms or provisions single out particular disabili-
ties, discrete groups of disabilities, disability in general, or specific
procedures or treatments of particular disabilities or groups of disa-
bilities. The burden of proof is placed on the employer to justify the
disability-based distinction, as the employer has control of the data
relied on to make the disability-based distinction decision. The em-
ployer must prove both that the plan is bona fide and that the disa-
bility-based distinction is not being used as a subterfuge to evade the
purposes of the ADA. Such proof may include actuarial data sup-
porting the employer's decision and rationale, or evidence demon-
strating why non-disability-based options were considered and
rejected. 177
4. The food handlers controversy and the preemption clause: a
federalist approach
A dissenting view in the House Judiciary Committee expressed
the concern that a person with AIDS could not be transferred out
of a food handling position even is the employer continued to pay
the same wages. This would be the "ultimate undue hardship."
"Unfortunately, there are many Americans who panic at the men-
tion of the AIDS and would refuse to patronize any food establish-
ment if an employee were known to have the virus." This policy
will "translate to no customers and no business at al.1
'78
176. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMPLOYMENT COMMISSION, EEOC ISSUES INTERIM EN-
FORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON THE APPLICATION OF THE ADA TO DISABILITY-BASED PROVI-
SIONS OF EMPLOYER-PROVIDED HEALTH INSURANCE, (June 8, 1993).
177. Id. The EEOC's Guidance standards are being tested in a recent case filed by the
EEOC against Mason Tenders District Council Trust Fund charging that an amendment to
the Fund's health insurance plan violates the ADA by excluding coverage of AIDS-related
conditions. Terence Donaghey, a plan participant of the multi-employer trust fund, was de-
nied coverage for his AIDS-related illnesses. The Fund failed to provide any actuarial basis
for the AIDS exclusion amendment. Under the EEOC's Guidance, disability-based exclu-
sions may be found to be subterfuges used to evade the ADA when they are not justified by
legitimate risk classification and underwriting procedures. The Fund has filed a motion for
summary judgment claiming that ERISA exempts it from the purview of the ADA. The suit
is pending in District Court in New York. Equal Opportunity Employment Commission,
EEOC FILES LAWSUIT AGAINST INSURANCE PLAN THAT EXCLUDES COVERAGE FOR IN-
DIVIDUAL wrrH AIDS, (June 9, 1993). The EEOC won its first judgment under the ADA in
June of 1993 (EEOC v. AIC Security Investigations, Ltd., 823 F.Supp. 571 (N.D.IIl. 1993)),
and filed two more cases in addition to Mason Tenders in Sept., 1993 (EEOC v. H. Hirsch-
field Sons Co. and EEOC v. Allied Services Division). EEOC ADA Litigation List (Oct.,
1993).
178. H.R. REP. No. 485(111), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 146-47 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 445.
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The House Amendment (the "Chapman Amendment"), but not
the Senate bill, specified that it shall not be a violation of the ADA
for an employer to refuse to assign or continue to assign any em-
ployee with an infectious or communicable disease of public health
significance to a job involving food handling, provided the employer
makes reasonable accommodation to offer a comparable alternative
employment opportunity.179 The House receded to the Senate with
the following amendment: The Secretary of Health and Human
Services must publish a list of infectious and communicable diseases
which are transmitted through handling of the food supply, specify-
ing the methods by which such diseases are transmitted, and widely
disseminating the information about the dangers and their modes of
transmission. 180
The ADA authorizes employers to refuse to assign individuals
to a job involving food handling if they have a presently infectious
condition that is listed as transmissible through the food supply.1 8'
The Chapman Amendment contained the fundamental miscon-
ception of disability law that it is permissible to fire an employee if
the reason for the discrimination is not the employer's biases, but to
protect the business from the irrational fears of patrons. The courts
do not allow employers to succumb to wholly unsubstantiated fears
of customers as a justification for discrimination, even if this in-
volves picketing of the establishment. 82 Exclusion of HIV-infected
food handlers was not condoned under the Rehabilitation Act and
state handicap law because of the absence of any evidence that in-
fection could be transmitted through food.'83
The purpose of the food handlers compromise was to ensure the
American public that "valid scientific and medical analysis, using
accepted public health methodologies and statistical practices re-
garding risk of transmission" will be brought to bear in analyzing
food-borne transmission of disease.184 This is the same standard
that ought to be applied to future public health decision making.
179. H.R. CONF. RrP. No. 596, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 565.
180. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(d)(1) (1992).
181. Id. § 12113(d)(2).
182. Mosby v. Joe's Westlake Restaurant, Cal. Super. Ct., San Francisco County, No.
865045, reported in Larry Gostin, The AIDS Litigation Project: A National Review of Court
and Human Rights Commission Decisions; Part II: Discrimination, 286 JAMA 2086, 2086-93
(1990).
183. See, e.g., Little v. Bryce & Randall's Food Market, 733 F.2d 937 (Tex. App. Hous.
1st Dist. 1987).
184. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 596, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1990).
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The food handlers controversy was a largely irrelevant Congres-
sional pandering to the unsubstantiated fears of the public about
AIDS. What emerged as a problem of significant import, however,
was the interaction between the ADA, and state or municipal pub-
lic health statutes. Federal laws, unless they specify otherwise, pre-
empt state and local statutes with comparable coverage. The ADA
specifies that state or local law which creates "greater protection for
the rights of individuals with disabilities" is not preempted. 185 The
question arises whether public health laws which restrict a disabled
person's rights more than the ADA allows is preempted. The sim-
ple answer is that all state and local public health law which re-
stricts the rights of persons with communicable diseases in ways
which are inconsistent with the ADA will be invalidated by federal
courts. Although the preemption provision in 42 U.S.C. § 12113(c)
applies only to food handlers, it illustrates clearly the interaction of
the entire ADA with public health law. That section specifies that
state, county, or local law or regulation designed to protect the pub-
lic health from individuals who pose a significant risk of contamina-
tion of the food supply is not overruled or modified by the ADA.
The House Conference Report emphasizes that section 103(c)(3)
"clearly defines certain types of existing and prospective state and
local public health laws that are not pre-empted by the ADA." 186
The public health law must be designed to protect the community
from significant public health risks which cannot be eliminated by
reasonable accommodation. This pre-emption strategy supports le-
gitimate state and local laws and regulations designed to protect the
public from communicable disease, thus carrying out "both the let-
ter and the spirit" of the ADA. 187
The ADA appears to interfere with the classic constitutional
principle that the state has sole police power authority to preserve
the public health. True federalism, however, provides states with
ample authority to regulate public health, but only within national
guidelines ensuring that decisions are based upon rigorous public
health evidence, rather than on false perception, unsubstantiated
fears or pure prejudice. Properly understood, the ADA strikes a
constitutional balance that can only generate better and more con-
sistent public health decision making.
185. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(b) (1992) (emphasis added).
186. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 596, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 17-18 (1990).
187. Id.
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CONCLUSION: A STANDARD OF PUBLIC HEALTH
REVIEW BASED UPON ANTI-DISCRIMINATION
PRINCIPLES
The Americans with Disabilities Act emerges as far more effec-
tive in reviewing public health powers than deferential constitu-
tional analysis. The standard of review proposed in this paper
would place the burden of proof on public health authorities to
demonstrate by rigorous scientific assessment: the mode of trans-
mission is well established; the person is currently contagious and is
likely to remain so for the duration of the control measure; a rea-
sonable likelihood exists that the person will actually transmit the
disease if the control measures are not applied; the transmission of
disease may result in serious harm; and the costs and human rights
burdens are not disproportionate to the public health benefit to be
achieved.
This standard is exacting and requires the public health depart-
ment to have a clear basis for the exercise of its powers. The reason
for the more focused review is that the ADA re-states the funda-
mental question that courts must ask of public health regulators.
No longer must the courts ask what risks an uninformed, perhaps
prejudiced, public is prepared to tolerate. Instead, courts should
inquire whether there is sufficiently convincing evidence of harm to
the public to justify discrimination against a person with disabilities.
Once the issue is framed as coming within the corpus of anti-dis-
crimination law, rather than the vague and undifferentiated tradi-
tions of the police powers, a whole new way of thinking about
public health law becomes possible.
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